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NOTES
THE SCHOOL OF LAW
The Alumni Prize for maintaining the highest scholastic average
during the entire three year course of study was divided between
Harry W. Jones and Lewis A. Sigler. Mr. Jones also received the
Richard Wagner Brown Prize, awarded annually to the member
of the graduating class who, in the estimation of the faculty, best
exemplifies the qualities of scholarship, leadership and character.
The Mary Hitchcock Thesis Prize was awarded to Arthur C.
Gaines.
Notes
PUBLICATION AS A RELINQUISHMENT OF THE
COMMON LAW RIGHT IN LITERARY PROPERTY
Legal recognition of creative genius and its right to protection
against piracy antedates any statutory move in its behalf. The
rights of an author in the unpublished manuscript of his book or
play, of the artist in his sketches, of the architect in his concept
reduced to blueprint-came to be regarded by the common lawjudges as "literary property," and was accorded protection the
same as any other personal property., Literary property has
been defined as "the right which entitles an author or his assigns
to all use and profit in his composition, to which no independent
right is, either by action or omission on his or their part, vested
in another person." This definition is considered an improve-
ment on the ordinary one which is said to be "the exclusive right
of a proprietor to multiply copies of a composition." The latter
is too narrow a view because the circulation of copies is only one
of the ways in which the subject of literary property may be
used.2
The creator's use may be by withholding his work from the
world altogether,3 or by causing it to be printed and hiding away
the volumes,' or by permitting a restricted use among a selected
group of friends.5 It is he who has right of first publication,6
1 Palmer v. DeWitt (1873) 47 N. Y. 532 at 537; Note (1922) 35 Harvard
Law Rev. 600.
2 5 Words and Phrases (1st Series) 4187.
a Note (1922) 35 Harvard Law Rev. 600.
4 Jewelers Mere. Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Pub. Co. (1898) 155 N. Y.
241, 49 N. E. 872.
5 Palmer v. DeWitt, supra, at 537; Prince Albert v. Strange (1899) 2 De-
Gex 652; 64 Eng. Rep. 293 at 302.
6 Bobbs Merrill Co. v. Strauss (C. C. A. 2, 1906) 147 F. 15.
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but the rule is broadly stated that when once his work is pub-
lished, his common law rights cease,7 and his only protection is
through statute. Thus it may be said that the law recognizes
an intangible estate in literary property,8 which is considered
distinct from any right of ownership under the laws of copyright. 9
Under what circumstances courts will declare that there has
been a publication amounting to an abandonment of the common
law rights, is to be developed herein.
The common law required that the product of intellectual labor
be embodied in material form, capable of identification before it
was protected.' 0 Thus, mere ideas as such were not subjects of
literary property until put into sequence, and then it was merely
the arrangement of thoughts that was protected against duplica-
tion without the author's consent."
Like all property, literary property consists of a bundle of
claims, privileges, powers and immunities.' 2 The statutory right
is of no value until there has been a publication; the common law
right is lost as soon as there has been a publication. 13 In effect,
protection under the latter is sought mostly in situations where
the subject either may not be copyrighted, or where for some
other reason the owner has not come under the federal statute.
The term "publication" is used, with some confusion, in two
senses throughout the cases. Legally speaking, it denotes the
point at which, for purposes of this topic, the common law rights
in literary property are relinquished, but this should be distin-
guished from the use of the term in the ordinary sense, meaning
merely the transformation of a manuscript, for instance, into a
printed copy, which act may or may not, depending on circum-
stances, amount to a legal relinquishment of the author's exclu-
sive rights. To promote clearness, the term "publication" will
be used in its lay meaning, and the legal result referred to as an
abandonment to the public of the common law right.
The cases raising the question of abandonment fall into two
broad classes. The first group involves the situation where the
owner of a literary property right seeks consciously to preserve
it for himself or his assignee, by placing an express restriction
7 Keene v. Kimball (1860) 82 Mass. 545 at 549; Aronson v. Baker (1887)
43 N. J. Eq. 365; 12 Atl. 177; Gilmore v. Sammons (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
269 S. W. 861 at 862.8 Note (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 458.
9 169 L. Times 419; Note (1922) 35 Harv. Law Rev. 600.
10 Note (1922) 35 Harv. Law Rev. 600.
1 Note (1930) 15 Cornell L. Q. 633.
12 (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 182.
is Warren and Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, at p. 200.
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on the use of his work, when its value to him demands its com-
munication in some way to others.
The question in these cases is what is the effect of the restric-
tion; in other words, will the intellectual work be preserved to
its creator exclusively, or will the courts hold that notwithstand-
ing his intent, it has been abandoned to the public and his com-
mon law rights lost?
The restriction seems in many instances to be fruitless unless
there has been some violation of confidence. The result is that
even where there has been a breach of contract not to publish,
the courts hold that an abandonment has been affected.
In the case of Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers Weekly
Publishing Co.,14 the plaintiff agency published a book of infor-
mation concerning the jewelry business, and furnished copies to
subscribers with the understanding that the books were merely
loaned, and were plaintiff's property which was to be returned
at the expiration of the subscription period. Defendant obtained
a book on a subscription and extracted material which he used
in a book published by himself. Plaintiff was refused an in-
junction against the sale of defendant's publication on the ground
that the issue of books to a limited list of subscribers on a
loan basis was a general publication, and the common law right
was lost, the rule being stated that a publication in print of an
uncopyrighted work and a subsequent circulation is a complete
dedication. 15 The court declared that if a book is put within
reach of the general public, no matter what limitation is put on
the use of it by the "lender," it is an abandonment. In this case
any member of the public who paid the subscription price could
borrow the book.
The following year, a New York court held that even a breach
of contract by the author to his assignee cuts off the common
law rights which the latter has acquired. 16 Herman Sudermann,
the German composer, sold the original manuscript of his play,
"Die, Erhe" to one Lederer for use in the United States, England,
Canada and Australia. Sudermann promised not to permit the
manuscript to appear in book form anywhere, but in violation of
his agreement, allowed the drama to be published and sold in
Berlin and in the United States. Defendant purchased a copy
and produced the play on the stage without consent of Lederer or
of the plaintiff to whom Lederer had assigned. The court held
that while plaintiff had acquired the author's common law right
to represent the play in the United States, that exclusiveness was
14 Jewelers Merc. Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Pub. Co., supra n. 4.
-a Wheaton v. Peters (1834) 8 Peters 591, at 676-7.
16 Daly v. Walroth (1899) 40 App. Div. 220, 57 N. Y. S. 1125 at 1126.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
cut off when the author permitted the play to be sold in book
form, even though in violation of his agreement not to publish.
Therefore the defendant might not be enjoined from producing
the play which Sudermann had made common property by its re-
lease in print.
An effort to distinguish between a loan and a sale or sale or
gift was attempted in Ladd v. Oxnard at about this time in a
Massachusetts federal court.17 Plaintiff published a book of
credit ratings with the stipulation to its subscribers that it was
a loan, and, if found in the hands of anyone not entitled to use it,
the publisher might take it up. Thus, the restriction was on the
use of the book but not on the extent to which it might be dis-
tributed. The court held 18 that the distribution itself amounted
to an abandonment to the public despite th attempt to restrict
its use to a certain purpose-that of giving information to sub-
scribers. This was a copyright infringement case, but the state-
ment was made that if no copyright had been obtained, the cir-
culation would defeat a common law right. The court's refusal
to view the "loan" as a restricted publication, seems logical be-
cause a person would be able to extend a subscription indefinitely
and thus obtain full benefit from its free circulation and still pre-
serve his common law rights. The common law thus would be
utilized to give him more than he could get under the copyright
law.
An owner of literary property who has released his work to a
magazine for publication can not by agreement with the publisher
prevent the public's reproduction of the published work. An
artist who permitted his picture to be printed in a magazine
under an agreement with the publisher that the latter would not
license any reproduction of the reproduction was held to have
abandoned his work for all purposes, and the agreement with
the publisher was of no effect as against the defendant who made
crude replicas of the magazine copy and sold them. It was not es-
tablished whether defendant obtained permission to copy maga-
zine print from the publisher, but it was immaterial whether he
did or not.' 9
A contract not to divulge the contents of grain market reports
protected the common law right of the gatherer of the informa-
tion in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain Company.20  Here
plaintiffs disseminated lists of information regarding market
quotations, under an agreement of confidence, to a large list of
subscribers. The court said that the collection of reports was sim-
1'Ladd v. Oxnard (C. C. Mass. 1896) 75 F. 703.
38 Ibid. p. 731.
19 Van Veen v. Franklin Knitting Mills (1932) 260 N. Y. S. 163 at 164.20 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain Co. (1905) 198 U. S. 235, at 250-51.
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ilar to a trade secret, and plaintiff did not lose his rights by com-
munication. Similarly, in Dodge v. Comstock,21 the distribution
of similar information was not an abandonment of plaintiff pub-
lisher's common law rights in his reports. In these two cases,
the court stressed the confidential relations between the parties
and the type of information printed as bearing strongly on the
decision. In previous cases there was either no privity between
the plaintiff and the infringer, or else the court felt called on to
distinguish between types of information disseminated, feeling
that protection should be given in some cases, possibly on account
of the particular nature of business involved, but was unwar-
ranted in others.
Where the contract between the parties refers to a "publica-
tion" of the play, it will be assumed by the court to have been a
general one in relinquishment of all common law rights, in the
absence of specific allegations in the petition that it was re-
stricted.22
The second class of cases involves the situation where the sub-
ject matter of the literary property right is made use of by its
owner by being printed or otherwise made known to the public
without his expressly placing any restriction on its use, as, for
instance, the sale of a book which has been published, the produc-
tion of a play on the stage, the release of news in newspapers
and bulletins, or the advertisement of the property by some form
of public representation thereof. The question here is what
types of use or conduct by the owner will be construed by the
courts as an implied abandonment of the common law rights.
The mere use by an author of his work in public before an
audience for a particular purpose does not dedicate that work to
the public. This proposition is illustrated by the situation of
lectures given publicly or before a class of pupils. 23 In the latter
case he may even give them copies of the lecture without their
acquiring the right to print, publish or use orally for profit.
24
Here, the dissemination of the information is implied to be re-
stricted to the use to which the owner puts it, even though he
has not so stated.
The drama presents problems all its own. It has been said
that the rights of the author of a play are two-fold: to profit by
its performance and by the sale of printed copies of his manu-
script. 25 Courts have therefore been called upon to decide the
effect of the production on the stage of an unpublished manu-
21 Dodge v. Comstock (1931) 251 N. Y. S. 172 at 176.
22 Allen v. Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 304 at 305.
23 Abernathy v. Hutchinson (1825) 1 H. & T. W. 28, 47 Eng. Rep. 1913.
24 Bartlett v. Crittenden (1852) 2 Fed. Cases 971.
21 Palmer v. DeWitt, supra n. 1, at 543.
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script as giving others the right (1) to cause the lines of it to be
printed, the extract of the manuscript having been obtained by
hearing the play on the stage, and (2) to produce it on the stage.
Palmer v. DeWitt 2 6 established the rule that the stage produc-
tion of an unpublished manuscript is not such a dedication to the
public as to authorize others to print and sell copies. T. W.
Robinson of London had composed a drama, "Play," and assigned
to plaintiff the exclusive right of printing, publishing and repro-
ducing the manuscript on the stage. It has been previously per-
formed at the Prince of Wales Theatre in London and later in
New York. Defendant, a resident of New. York, obtained a
transcript of the lines from persons who had heard it in London,
and began printing and selling copies in New York City. An
injunction against his so doing was granted.
The matter of preserving the exclusive right to represent the
drama on the stage after it had once been produced in the theatre
was attended with more difficulty. The early view27 was that
the release of an uncopyrighted dramatic work on the stage was
an abandonment to the public of the owner's right of profiting
solely from its performance. The court said that when the
proprietor permitted its representation before "an indiscriminate
audience for money," he destroyed his exclusive rights.28 This
seems to be the basis of the decision. The opinion went on to
state, it would seem, inconsistently, that the decision should not
be thought to sanction a taking for profit of the substance of a
lecture or other written discourse, or an operatic or concert num-
ber, under similar circumstances. There seems to be no justi-
fiable basis for this distinction. The court contents itself by
stating "There is nothing to show that defendant has done any-
thing beyond that which the dedication of plaintiff's property
authorized him to do," but fails to point out why there would be
a dedication in the case of a drama and none as to a concert or
lecture under the same circumstances.
The distinction drawn here has not gone unchallenged. Judge
Devens of Massachusetts, in a subsequent case 29 vigorously
critical of this view, says, "The late Charles Dickens was an ac-
complished reader from his own works. If he had selected a
story of his own to read, himself, before an audience, nobody
would have had a right to turn it to his own benefit. But the
celebrated novelist was also dramatically inclined. If he had
elected to represent the same piece on the stage, it would have
been released to the world."
26 Ibid. at p. 537.
27Keene v. Kimball, supra n. 7, at 545.
28 Ibid. at p. 550.29 Tompkuis v. Halleck (1882) 133 Mass. 32 at 40.
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The rule of Keene v. Kimball was overruled by the case of
Tompkins v. Halleck,30 and it is now settled that the stage pro-
duction of an unpublished manuscript is not such a dedication to
the public as to authorize others to produce it on the stage, even
though representation is made possible from a copy obtained by
a spectator who attended a public performance for money, and
later wrote it out from memory. In such cases, a curious distinc-
tion had previously been drawn between obtaining the substance
of the lines of the play by remembering what one heard while a
spectator at a play, and later transcribing them from memory,
and the practice of obtaining the lines by taking stenographic
notes during the performance. The former was considered per-
fectly ethical, while the latter was frowned upon, and use of
lines so obtained would not be permitted by the courts. In Tomp-
kins v. Halleck both practices were considered equally objection-
able because they produce the same result. "It is not the method
of copying, nor even the copying itself," said the court, "but the
use from the copy to the detriment of the plaintiff's rights that is
an infringement." 3 1
It is likewise held that public performance of a musical compo-
sition of a theatrical nature is not an abandonment to the public
that would defeat a subsequent copyright. In McCarthy &
Fischer, Inc. 'v. White,3 2 plaintiff allowed his song to be sung
in acts in defendant's show for several weeks before obtain-
ing a copyright. The court stated that only a publication of
the song in print would amount to an abandonment of the rights
of the author. It was not a dedication to the public to give copies
of the song to a limited group of artists for a similar purpose.
The motion picture industry has also invoked the aid of the
common law for the protection of the photoplay, which is the
interpretation of a play expressed in actions on the screen, as
distinguished from the scenario, the concept of the play expressed
in words. The question to be considered is what will be deemed
to be an abandonment of either to the public, and what is the
effect of such release on (1) the right to perform or show the
positive film, and on (2) the right to reproduce the film itself
either by re-enacting the play and taking a negative, or by re-
filming the photoplay acquired, and selling the new negatives.
The mere giving up of the photoplay to another under a license
agreement, for the purpose of permitting it to be shown for a
limited period is not a dedication of it to the public by the owner,
so as to give the license the right to copyright it for his own bene-
so Ibid. p. 32; Ferris v. Frohman (1912) 223 U. S. 424.
a, Tompkins v. Halleck, supra n. 29, at 45.
32 McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1919) 259 F. 364.
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fit to the exclusion of the owner. In DeMille v. Casey, 3 the court
said, "the motion picture rights under the license agreement did
not fall into public use. The agreement shows a clear intent that
they should revert to plaintiff on termination of the license
Period."34
However, the outright sale of the positive film gives the pur-
chaser the right to show that particular photoplay himself or to
hire it out to others or dispose of it altogether. The sale is thus
an abandonment of the common law rights of exclusive exhibition
of that film as such. But it does not confer on the purchaser
the right to create other film copies of the photoplay by re-
filming the one sold or by re-enacting the same play in the same
way before a camera and selling the negatives. 35
A question that has been presented both as to plays and movies
is the effect of their prior performance in a foreign country. It
is the rule that such a presentation even with the author's con-
sent is not a publication in this country which works an abandon-
ment of his common law rights. This is true even where the
laws of the country where first performed declare that putting it
on the stage is a publication and require a public performance
as a prerequisite to getting a license to present it.36 The author
in this country still has his common law rights for purposes of
making motion pictures, 3 7 or for printing and selling copies of
the drama in this country,38 or for putting it on the stage here.
On the latter point, it was said in one case 39 that the English
statute regulating performance in England did not have the ef-
fect of depriving any British citizen of exercising his common
law rights in other countries. Such an enactment merely
governed his rights in England.
Just how far a proprietor may go in advertising his work by
displaying a portion thereof to public scrutiny, without dedicat-
ing it to the public is brought out by cases dealing with billboard
posters, circulation of dodgers, and publication in newspapers.
It is held that public posting of billboard advertisements showing
photographs of scenes of a play taken by flashlight from the
actual performance, is not a publication amounting to a dedica-
tion.40 It is rather an incident in the presentation of the play
which is not itself a dedication thereof. Here, again is the refer-
33 DeMille v. Casey (1923) 201 N. Y. S. 20.
4Ibid. p. 27.
35 Universal Film Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 218 F. 577.80 O'Neill v. Gen. Film Co. (1916) 171 App. Div. 854, 157 N. Y. S. 1028.
31Ibid. p. 1028.
38 Palmer v. DeWitt, supra n. 1, at p. 532.
9 Ferris v. Frohnman (1912) 223 U. S. 424 at 433.
40 O'Neill v. Gen. Film Co., supra n. 36 at 1028.
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ence to the requirement of publishing the manuscript in order to
effect a destruction of the common law rights, for the court in
O'Neill v. General Film Company said "the posters did not tell
the story of the play in connected form."' 41 Even a newspaper
criticism giving an account of the story of the play with com-
ments upon its presentation is not a relinquishment.42 From this
one may assume that it is not merely the telling of the story but
telling it in words of the author that would work an abandonment.
However, material distributed in the form of dodgers is not
protected against being copied, on the theory that the articles
therein are freely circulated to the world. In D'Ole v. Kansas City
Star,43 the plaintiff was a photographer who got up a pamphlet
entitled, "How to Sit When Having a Photo Taken," in advertise-
ment of his methods, and before obtaining a copyright of his
articles in the booklet, he permitted 10,000 copies to be scattered
about the city streets and in business houses. Defendant pub-
lished an article taken from a Philadelphia paper containing
several paragraphs that plaintiff had composed and put into the
pamphlet. The court refused relief on the ground that the circu-
lation amounted to an abandonment. The situation here is of
course obviously different from the previous cases. In the latter,
the advertising of the thing taken did not effect a publication be-
cause the subject was not itself circulated, but merely accounts
of it. Here, the thing advertised was plaintiff's photography,
but the thing taken was his article in the magazine telling about
it, which was freely distributed. This case merely follows the
general rule that publication in print and turning over copies of
the manuscript to the general public is a dedication.
It should be noted that it makes no difference whether the cir-
culation or release is gratuitous or for a price; an abandonment
may result if the public is given access to the thing. In the case
of Barmford v. Douglass Post Card & Machine Co.,4 4 plaintiff was
in the business of taking pictures of living models and making
post cards and selling them. Defendant copied the photos by
the half-tone process and undersold them, reproduced on cards.
The court held for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff
had by repeated sales, dedicated his work to the public and since
the cards were not trade marks to distinguish any product of
plaintiff, there was nothing in the way of unfair competition.
The release may constitute merely an exposure to public gaze in
order to constitute a dedication. Architectural concepts are usu-
41 Ibid. p. 1037.
42 D'Ole v. Kansas City Star (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1899) 94 F. 840.
43 Ibid. p. 843.
44 Bamford v. Douglass Post Card & Machine Co. (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1908)
158 F. 355.
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ally protected until they emerge from blueprint, but when they
take on material form in a building, they are not protected
against piracy. A plaintiff who had erected a porch of novel and
artistic design was refused an injunction against defendant's
building a copy of it on the theory that since the physical ex-
pression of the plans had stood several years open to the public
eye, this was a publication that destroyed plaintiff's common
law rights.45 Even plans as such may not be protected if they
are communicated to members of the public by being filed with
the city building department and superintendent for construction
of the building.46
As a legal problem, publication of news seems to stand in a
class by itself because of its own unique qualities. Unlike a dra-
matic or literary work, it is unoriginal as to substance. It is
rather a chronicle of facts descriptive of events that have occur-
red and are thus open to public knowledge. To be of any value
at all it must be disseminated while fresh. The question is how
far may a publication of it go and yet preserve the gatherer's
rights in it to his own benefit.
The latest development on this point tends to favor the protec-
tion of common law rights against destruction by publication
of news. The International News Service ,v. Associated Press47
advances the proposition that news is not abandoned for all pur-
poses by publication in newspapers of plaintiff's members and
by being posted on bulletins of the plaintiff for purposes of
being read by the public; publication does not confer on plain-
tiff's competitor the right to use the substance for its own
aggrandizement to the detriment of plaintiff. The decision does
not preserve the property right indefinitely, but only until the
members have been enabled to realize a return from their invest-
ment. It may be said then that here is a recognition of an aban-
donment for some purposes-as against the public in general there
is no right after first publication-but an absence of abandon-
ment for others-as between the parties themselves, to protect
against unfair competition. 48
In his dissenting opinion, Brandeis prefers to treat news as
possessing characteristics of ordinary subjects of literary prop-
erty, whereby the first general distribution would destroy the
author's common law rights. He discredits the theory that this
is a restricted publication, his concept of "restricted" seeming
to go on the range or number of persons who receive copies, as
opposed to the majority view which implies a restriction in pur-
45 Note (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 459.
48 Wright v. Eisle (1903) 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N. Y. S. 887 at 889.
47 International News Service v. Associated Press (1918) 248 U. S. 215.
-8 Ibid. pp. 219-20.
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pose-that in each issue of the paper, there is an implied
condition that the news shall not be used gainfully in compe-
tition with the Associated Press. According to Brandeis, where
the publication is general, even express words of restriction are
ineffective, regardless of the intent of the owner. He acknowl-
edges there have been instances where the publication has been
held to be restricted, but says in these cases there was no general
publication in print comparable to issue in a daily newspaper. 49
Transmission of news over a telegraph instrument does not
constitute a general publication. This is said to be analagous
to the writing and delivery of letters which is not a publication,
telegraphy being merely a means which modern science has de-
vised for speedy communication between persons at a distance,
and is only a qualified publication.50
It is said that dedication is a matter of intent,5 1 and where the
circumstances indicate that the owner does not intend to relin-
quish all right but merely wishes to gives the public a limited
or partial use and reserve to himself what is not given, the pub-
lic acquires what is given and nothing more.5 2 To illustrate, if
a composer of an orchestral score of an opera arranges it for
piano use in whole or part and causes piano arrangement to be
published and sold, he donates his music to the public for use on
the piano only, but not for purpose of authorizing another com-
poser to make a new orchestration of his music and performing it
in public for profit.53
Drummond v. Altemus5 4 presents a situation showing that
under certain circumstances the unauthorized use of a literary
article will be enjoined even though it has been published in a
legal sense. Plaintiff sent to the British Weekly, a journal, cer-
tain reports of his lectures permitting it to print them in its
columns. Defendant read the articles and then composed a book
purporting to contain lectures delivered by plaintiff, founded on
matter taken from them and stated incorrectly. The court gave
as its reason for allowing relief that defendant under color of
editing plaintiff's work, presented the material incorrectly, and
also created impressions that the entire series was included when
really there was only a part. But it was stated that if the mat-
ter had been literally copied and there had been no misrepresen-
tations as to its character and extent, plaintiff would have
been without remedy, since there had been a complete abandon-
49 Ibid. p. 224.
:0 Kiernan v. Telegraph Co. (N. Y. 1876) 50 How. Practice 1943.
1 International News Service v. Assoc. Press, supra n. 47, at 221.
52 Aronson v. Baker, supra n. 7.
3 Ibid. p. 370.
54 Drummond v. Altemus (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1894) 60 F. 338.
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ment as result of the first publication. Protection here was ac-
corded against falsely representing the work to be the plaintiff's.
This was a fraud on him and on the purchaser.
Business ideas as such do not get much protection from the
courts on a basis of literary property. Practical difficulties ac-
count for this attitude. When one submits his scheme to a com-
pany, and it is rejected, it is difficult indeed for him to prove that
the project, subsequently launched by the company, in which he
can see germs of his own thought, was really suggested to them
by him in the first instance. Moreover, the fact that more than
one person may have the same notion makes it hard to prove that
it was altogether original. The cases indicate that when one
makes a proposition to a business concern it is common property
after its disclosure.55
By contrast, literary concepts have fared better. In Thomp-
son v. Famous Players Lasky Corporation,5 6 plaintiff wrote a
scenario and mailed it to defendant for acceptance but received
no answer. A movie was subsequently produced which was sub-
stantially the same as plaintiff's scenario, and defendant was
required to pay her for it. There was no attempt here to sug-
gest that by sending the scenario to defendant plaintiff released
it to the world.
It is well-settled that the common law right is terminated
when the owner of literary property seeks protection under the
copyright statutes. 57 The purpose in doing the latter is to en-
able the author to distribute copies of his work to others and yet
preserve his own right of profit from their use, as contrasted
with his claiming the common law right of keeping and using
them exclusively.
But what is the effect of an attempt to copyright which for
some reason fails? In such a situation it is held that a deposit
of copies of a book with the Librarian of Congress as a pre-
requisite to obtaining a copyright constitutes a publication which
will be an abandonment to the public of the literary property
right. By this delivery it is said that the book is put within
reach of the general public without another act on the part of
the author.58 The fact that one is required to make a delivery
of the book to secure the copyright does not save the common
law right.5 9
5 Moore v. Ford Motor Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 529;
27 Mich. L. Rev. 708; 25 Mich. L. Rev. 886 at 887.
50 Thompson v. Famous Players Lasky Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1925)
3 F. (2d) 707.
57 Werkmeister v. Amer. Litho. (C. C. A. 2, 1904) 134 F. 321.
58 Jewelers Merc. Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Pub. Co., supra n. 4.
59 Callaghan v. Myers (1888) 128 U. S. 617.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/10
NOTES
The decisions indicate that a subject of literary property may
be a composite of a whole set of different rights as to its use, and
copyright of one will not necessarily destroy the common law
right as to another form of use. Thus, copyrighting of a motion
picture representation of an uncopyrighted drama by one owning
the literary performing rights is a relinquishment of the owner's
common law motion picture rights in the play to the extent of
the scenes represented by the copyrighted films. Here there is
a distinction drawn between motion picture and literary and
dramatic rights, the common law rights in the latter two not
being affected by copyright of the movie version of a book or play.
A copyright of the photoplay gives the owner of the copyright
merely an exclusive right to his own film version. In O'Neill ,v.
General Film Company,6o plaintiff had a contract with Famous
Players Company for making a motion picture film adapted from
the drama "Monte Cristo." Plaintiff engaged a company of
actors who gave a performance of the play before a camera;
films were prepared and released for circulation to theatres. The
company copyrighted the films, and it was held that plaintiff
parted with its motion picture rights in the photoplay copy-
righted to the extent of the scenes therein represented, but the
question was left open as to whether all common law motion
picture rights including those scenes in the play but not repre-
sented in the copyrighted film, had been abandoned also. This
would be pertinent if the owner of the literary performing rights
should wish to make a different movie version of the play.
Where the law distinguishes between rights in a scenario and
in a photoplay by permitting a copyright of either, a copyright
of the photoplay constitutes a relinquishment of the common law
rights in it.61 Whether this also constitutes an abandonment of
rights in the scenario has not been decided.
A copyright of a play in a foreign country where the law re-
quires publication as a condition precedent to copyright is a
dedication to the public in this country.62 However, the mere
filing of a copy of the play in the foreign country as a condition
precedent to obtaining a license to present it is not a dedication
here.6 3 Thus it is the actual copyright which destroys the com-
mon law right, and not the submission of it to a public official,
which is said under our law to give the public access to it and to
relinquish the common law right.
In considering whether an abandonment has been effected that
60 O'Neill v. Gen. Film Co., supra n. 36, at 1028.
61 Universal Film Co. v. Copperman (C. C. A. N. Y. 1914) 218 F. 577
at 580.
862 O'Neill v. Gen. Film Co., supra n. 36, at p. 1034.
68 Ibid. p. 1034.
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would vitiate a subsequent copyright the courts look to the sub-
stance of the material rather than to the form in which it is re-
leased. Serial publication of a book in monthly instalments has
been held to be a publication that renders ineffective the copy-
right of the whole book which is obtained subsequently, although
before publication of the book as an entirety. An interesting
case involves Oliver Wendell Holmes, who permitted chapters of
his "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table" to be published in the
Atlantic Monthly. His executor, in seeking to restrain Defend-
ant from using copies of the chapters taken from the Atlantic
Monthly, contended that publication of the chapters was not a
publication of the book, which was the subject of copyright. The
injunction was refused, there being no infringement.0 4
The most recent issues in the realm of literary property are
concerned with radio. In the United States, the rights of the
broadcaster to protection against unauthorized exploitation of
his programs are still largely in the balance, but continental
Europe has indicated precedents that may illuminate our way.
At present commercial parasites threaten to enrich themselves
at the expense of 600 broadcasting stations in this country, which
represent a $180,000,000 per annum industry, and of adver-
tisers whose annual expenditures on the air total approximately
$40,000,000. 65 Artists whose talents are broadcast are also
claiming protection. Thus, to be entirely adequate, relief must
be given three ways.
By strict tests of legal abandonment to the public of literary
property, it would seem that the chances of preserving common
law rights on the air are scant. The broadcaster has been
likened to "a musician who sings before an open window" 00
with a corresponding release to the world. Means for defeating
a dedication which have been indicated by the courts as to pro-
prietors of other forms of literary property are unavailing here.
The broadcaster can not limit dissemination of his program to a
selected group of hearers without choking off his profit at the
outset. It is only by a complete surrender of that which calls
for protection that its commercial value can be realized. It is
obvious that the test of abandonment here can not be the extent
of dissemination to the general public. How then is legal theory
to be moulded to meet the situation?
The analogy of radio programs to news suggests a solution.
Both are equally subject to wide dissemination, and the latter is
protected as against a competitor by the decision in the Inter-
64 Holmes v. Hurst (1899) 174 U. S. 83 at 85.
65 Louis G. Caldwell, "Piracy of Broadcast Programs" (1930) 30 Col. L.
Rev. 1087.
66 Ibid. p. 1101.
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national News Service case. The court said there, "abandon-
ment to the public is a question of intent, and the entire organiza-
tion of the Associated Press negatives such a purpose." 7 Publi-
cation by each member of news in its periodical was not deemed
abandoned for all purposes merely by release in print. It was
the extent of the purpose rather than of the physical dissemina-
tion that governed the abandonment.
Why might not the same test of intent be applied to radio?
It would be quite reasonable on this basis to hold that a radio
program, transmitted for a limited purpose, can not be utilized
by competing studios or theatres.
Specific instances of piracy of broadcast programs include in-
tercepting of programs prior to transmission by the station to
the public, usually by third persons, by wire-tapping, reproduc-
tion of programs by rebroadcasting by another studio or by re-
transmission by wire, recording on phonograph records offered
for sale, operation of loudspeakers in theatres as part of the
entertainment paid for, and in other public places for profit.68
In the United States we have met these practices by statutes
which are expected to be adequate in some cases. In others it
may be possible to invoke the common law rights. Section 27 of
the Radio Act of 1927 forbids interception of messages and pub-
lication of contents of an intercepted message unless authorized
by the sender, except communications broadcast by amateurs or
others for use of the general public. Section 28 provides that a
broadcasting station shall not rebroadcast any program of an-
other station without express authority of the originating
station. 69
It is thought that the protection given is not very broad. It
would seem that it extends to programs coming directly from the
studio of the originating station but neglects broadcasts of ball
games and prize fights from the stadium or ringside. It is un-
certain also whether the statute would prohibit piracy by anyone
but a competitor broadcaster. But he is not the only offender.
Telephone companies have sought to build up good will by picking
up programs directly by wire and transmitting them to sub-
scribers.70
European response to the problem came in 1925 at the first
International Juridical Congress on Radio Communication in
Paris. A resolution was adopted that "no commercial exploita-
tion should be made of radio emissions, without the agreement of
the sender," and all the nations assured to members of the union
6T International News Service v. Assoc. Press, supra n. 47 at 219.
SI 55 Amer. Bar Assn. Reports (1930) 370; 30 Col. Law Rev. at 1089-95.
69 Ibid.
7o 30 Col. L. Rev., supra n. 65, at p. 1092.
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protection against unfair competition. Four congresseses have
since been held. At a meeting of the Association for Protection
of Industrial Property held in Rome in 1928 it was resolved that
broadcasting should be treated according to rules of unfair com-
petition and according to those governing an author's rights.
These efforts have been reflected somewhat in the decisions of
the courts. In 1927, a Defendant in Germany picked up a broad-
cast of a prize fight and made phonograph records of it and sold
them. The station sued and on appeal to the Court of Appeal
in Berlin, obtained judgment on the ground of unfair competi-
tion, but there is no suggestion of any general principle justify-
ing recognition of property rights in broadcasters over their
station's emissions. 71 Another case resulted in a decision to the
contrary in the German Supreme Court. A broadcasting station
sent an announcer to Friedrickshafen for the purpose of giving
an account of the arrival of the Graf Zeppelin from America.
Defendant published a newspaper "extra," giving the events
as broadcast by plaintiff. The court refused an injunction
against publishing of news received from the broadcasts, and
distinguished between the two cases by saying that in the latter
there was mere utilization of that which had been made public
and was common knowledge.72
In France, the Conseil d'Etat brought to an end in 1929 litiga-
tion resulting from unauthorized broadcasting by the Lyons
Broadcasting Station of phonograph records of performances by
two eminent vocal artists. They were unsuccessful, but the up-
per court was sympathetic and conceded that the broadcaster's
omission to tell the public that the audition was made by phono-
graph records was a serious wrong but held that the artist must
prove specific damage suffered thereby.
73
In spite of some setbacks, it is thought that the tendency in
Europe is in the direction of a more thorough protection of both
station and artist.74
One decision by the Supreme Court of the United States on
the question is a copyright infringement case but it is thought
that it may be a forerunner of some protection given to common
law rights. Defendant hotel had a master receiving set leading
to all public and private rooms, giving radio entertainment to
guests. A new musical composition "Just Imagine" was trans-
ferred to the American Society of Composers. Authors and Pub-
lishers, of which plaintiff was president. The hotel set, without
71 Amer. Bar. Assn. Reports, supra n. 68.
72 Ibid.
73 56 Amer. Bar. Assn. Reports (1932) 445.
714 55 Amer. Bar. Assn. Reports (1930) at 372.
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permission of the copyright owners, picked up the broadcast. It
was notified by the society that the program was of copyrighted
music and asked to desist using it until license was obtained. The
district court held that there was no infringement, and that the
exclusive right given by the copyright to perform a musical com-
position does not carry a proprietary interest in waves that go
out on the air, as such waves are the common property of all; and,
moreover, reception on a radio receiver is not a performance such
as would infringe the copyright. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision, holding that the rebroadcasting by the public use of a
receiving set was a public performance for profit within the copy-
right act and hence an infringement.75
The broadcaster is not the only sufferer from unauthorized use
made of his programs after they have been released into the air.
The advertiser stands vulnerable to being bereft of his advertis-
ing slogans and catch words that have achieved a definite value
to him through their meaning in the public mind. To what ex-
tent is his release of them on the air to be a donation of his
ingenuity to anyone who cares to pick them up and profit by their
use? Moreover, the artist is deprived of profit for his per-
formance by unauthorized making of phonograph records from
numbers broadcast. 76 It has been suggested that Section 28 of
the Radio Act be broadened to cover these practices.
Predictions as to the future of any possible radio literary prop-
erty rights are interesting. The American Bar Association be-
lieves that substantial recognition should be given to a right of
property in broadcast programs analagous to that accorded
artistic and intellectual property, which will be sufficient to pro-
tect those whose investments made the program possible77
Louis Caldwell, "Piracy of Radio Programs,"78 regards the
doctrine of unfair competition as sufficient to protect the broad-
caster against most practices. But where the commercial pur-
pose is not so evident, as in the case of broadcasting in hotel lob-
bies, barber shops and restaurants, the use being usually to estab-
lish good will and not for purpose of direct competition with the
broadcaster, the unfair competition doctrine will not apply. Le-
gal relations will be simplified if the broadcaster alone has rights
against exploiters, for he in turn can be required by contract to
protect authors and artists.
LOUISE CLAYTON LARRABEE, '34.
75 .6 Amer. Bar. Assn. Reports (1932) at 446; 55 Amer. Bar. Assn. Re-
ports (1930) at 410; ibid. at 370; Berlin v. Daigle (C. C. A. 5, 1929) 31 F.
(2d) 832.
16 Supra n. 68.
77 Ibid. at 372.
18 Supra n. 65, at 1111.
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